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We analyse an argument of Deutsch, which purports to show that the determinis-
tic part of classical quantum theory together with deterministic axioms of classical
decision theory, together imply that a rational decision maker behaves as if the
probabilistic part of quantum theory (Born’s law) is true. We uncover two miss-
ing assumptions in the argument, and show that the argument also works for an
instrumentalist who is prepared to accept that the outcome of a quantum measure-
ment is random in the frequentist sense: Born’s law is a consequence of functional
and unitary invariance principles belonging to the deterministic part of quantum
mechanics. Unfortunately, it turns out that after the necessary corrections we have
done no more than give an easier proof of Gleason’s theorem under stronger as-
sumptions. However, for some special cases the proof method gives positive results
while using different assumptions to Gleason. This leads to the conjecture that
the proof could be improved to give the same conclusion as Gleason under unitary
invariance together with a much weaker functional invariance condition.
1. Introduction: are quantum probabilities fixed by
quantum determinism?
Quantum mechanics has two components: a deterministic component, con-
cerned with the time evolution of an isolated quantum system; and a
stochastic component, concerned with the random jump which the state of
that system makes when it comes into interaction with the outside world,
sending at the same time a piece of random information into the outside
world. The perceived conflict between these two behaviours is ‘the mea-
surement problem’ as exemplified by Schro¨dinger’s cat.
Here we do not resolve this problem but just address the peaceful co-
existence, or possibly even the harmony, between the two behaviours. We
will show that some classical deterministic quantum mechanical assump-
tions, together with the assumption that the outcome of measuring an
observable is random, uniquely determines the probability distribution of
1
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the outcome—harmony indeed. More specifically, two generally accepted
invariance properties of observables and quantum systems determine the
shape of the probability distribution of measured values of an observable—
namely, the shape specified by Born’s law. The invariance properties are
connected to unitary evolution of a quantum system, and to functional
transformation of an observable, respectively.
This work was inspired by Deutsch (1999). There it is claimed that a
still smaller kernel of deterministic classical quantum theory together with
a small part of deterministic decision theory together force a rational deci-
sion maker to behave as if the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory
are true. In our opinion there are three problems with the paper. The
first is methodological: we do not accept that the behaviour of a rational
decision maker should play a role in modelling physical systems. We are on
the other hand happy to accept a stochastic component (with a frequentist
interpretation) in physics, so we translate Deutsch’s axioms and conclusions
about the behaviour of a rational decision maker into axioms and conclu-
sions about the relative frequency with which various outcomes of a physical
experiment take place. The second problem is that it appears that Deutsch
has implicitly made use of a further axiom of unitary invariance alongside
his truely minimalistic collection, and needs to greatly strengthen one of
the existing assumptions concerning functional invariance, from one-to-one
functions also to many-to-one functions. Neither addition nor strengthen-
ing is controversial from a classical deterministic quantum physics point
of view, but both are very substantial from a mathematical point of view.
The third problem is that the strengthening of the functional invariance
assumption puts us in the position that we have assumed enough to apply
Gleason’s (1957) theorem. Thus at best, Deutsch’s proof is an easy proof of
Gleason’s theorem using an extra, heavy, assumption of unitary invariance.
The fact that Deutsch’s proof is incomplete has been observed by Bar-
num et al. (2000). However these authors did not attempt to reconstruct
a correct proof. In the concluding section we relate our work to theirs.
Wallace (2002, 2003a,b) has also studied Deutsch’s claims at great length
and from a rather philosophical point of view. I did not attempt to relate
his work to mine. The same goes for Saunders (2002).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we put forward func-
tional and unitary invariance assumptions, which are usually considered
consequences of traditional quantum mechanics, but are here to be taken
as axioms from which some of the traditional ingredients are to be de-
rived, turning the tables so to speak. One would like to make the axioms
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as modest as possible, while still obtaining the same conclusions. Hence
it is important to distinguish between different variants of the assump-
tions. In particular, we distinguish between (stronger) assumptions about
the complete probability law of outcomes of measurements of observables,
and (weaker) assumptions about the mean values of those probability laws.
An invariance assumption concerning a class of functions, is weaker, if it
only demands invariance for a smaller class of functions, and in particular
we distinguish between invariance for all functions, including many-to-one
functions, and invariance just for one-to-one functions.
In Section 3 we prove the required result, Born’s law, for a special state
(equal weight superposition of two eigenstates). This case is the central
part of Deutsch (1999), who only sketches the generalization to arbitrary
states. And already, it seems an impressive result. We prove the result,
for this special state, in two forms—in law, and in mean value—the former
being stronger of course; using appropriate variants of our assumptions.
Deutsch’s proof is incomplete, since he only appeals to unitary invariance,
while it is clear that a functional invariance assumption is also required.
The strengthening of the functional invariance assumption can also be
used to derive probabilities as well as mean values, and it is moreover useful
from Deutsch’s point of view of rational behaviour, if one wants to extend in
a very natural way the class of games being played. Roughly speaking, we
extend from the game of buying a lottery ticket to a game at the roulette
table. In the former game the only question is, how much is one ticket
worth. In the latter game one may make different kinds of bets, and the
question is how much is any bet worth.
However, so far we have only been concerned with a rather special state:
an equal weight superposition of two eigenstates. As mentioned before
Deutsch only sketches the extension to the general case of an arbitrary,
possibly mixed, state. He outlined a step-by-step argument of successive
generalizations. In Section 4 we follow the same sequence of steps, strength-
ening the assumptions as seems to be needed.
In Section 5, we look back at the various versions of our assumptions,
in the light of what can be got from them. We also evaluate the overall
result of completing Deutsch’s programme. From a mathematical point
of view, it turns out that we have done no more, at the end of the day,
than derive the same conclusion as that of Gleason’s theorem, while mak-
ing stronger assumptions. The payoff has just been a much easier proof.
Gleason’s theorem only assumes functional invariance, we have assumed
unitary invariance too. We argue that unitary invariance corresponds to a
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natural physical intuition, while functional invariance is something which
one could not have expected in advance. It is supported by experiment, and
is theoretically supported in special cases (measurements of components of
product systems) by locality.
We conclude with the conjecture that unitary invariance together with a
weakened functional invariance assumption is sufficient to obtain the same
conclusion.
2. Assumptions: degeneracy, functional invariance, unitary
invariance
Recall that a quantum system in a pure state is described or represented by
a unit vector
∣
∣ψ
〉
in a Hilbert space, supposed to be infinite-dimensional,
and that an observable or physical quantity is described or represented by a
self-adjoint (perhaps unbounded) operator X on that space. I shall assume
thatX has a discrete and nondegenerate spectrum; thus there is a countably
infinite collection of real eigenvalues x and eigenstates
∣
∣X=x
〉
, so that
one can write X =
∑
x x
∣∣X=x
〉〈
X=x
∣∣, while
∣∣ψ
〉
=
∑
λx
∣∣X=x
〉
where
λx =
〈
X=x
∣∣ψ
〉
. Throughout the paper we make the following background
assumption:
Assumption 0 Random outcome, in spectrum. The outcome of measur-
ing X is one of its eigenvalues x—which one, is random. Its probability
distribution (law) depends on X and on
∣
∣ψ
〉
.
I write measψ(X) for the random outcome of measuring observable X on
state
∣
∣ψ
〉
, and law
(
measψ(X)
)
for its probability distribution, i.e., the col-
lection of probabilities Pr
{
measψ(X) ∈ B} for all Borel sets B of the real
line. Deutsch’s paper has the more modest aim just to compute the mean
value of this probability law, E
(
measψ(X)
)
, though as I shall argue before,
even under his own terms (computing values of betting games) the whole
probability law is of interest.
Throughout the paper I will be playing with three main assumptions,
though sometimes in stronger and sometimes in weaker forms. Here are the
three, in their strongest versions:
Assumption 1 Degeneracy in eigenstates.
Pr
{
meas∣∣X=x
〉(X) = x
}
= 1. (1)
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In an eigenstate of an observable, the corresponding eigenvalue is the certain
outcome of measurement.
Assumption 2 Functional invariance.
Pr
{
f(measψ(X)) = y
}
= Pr
{
measψ(f(X)) = y
}
. (2)
Measuring a function f of an observable is operationally indistinguishable
from measuring the observable, and then taking the same function of the
outcome. Parenthetically remark that this indistinguishability is only as
far as the outcome is concerned; as far as the new state of the quantum
system is concerned there will be a difference, if the function is many-to-
one. Parts of Deutsch’s proof only need this assumption for one-to-one
functions. In fact he only explicitly used this assumption for the affine
functions f(x) = ax+ b, but implicitly other functions, including many-to-
one functions, are involved too.
Assumption 3 Unitary invariance.
Pr
{
measUψ(X) = x
}
= Pr
{
measψ(U
∗XU) = x
}
. (3)
We will see that, at first instance, we only require this assumption to hold
for a special class of unitary operations U , namely those which permute
eigenstates of X . There is then a one-to-one correspondence u on the eigen-
values of X with inverse u∗ such that UXU∗ = u(X), U∗XU = u∗(X),
and U
∣
∣X=x
〉
=
∣
∣X=u(x)
〉
. In the special case that ψ is an eigen-
state
∣
∣X=x
〉
, Assumption 3 follows from Assumption 1 (degeneracy-in-
eigenstates). Later we also need Assumption 3 for unitary operations, di-
agonal in the basis corresponding to X .
Since in the above assumptions, x and y are arbitrary, one could restate
the three main assumptions as:
law
(
meas∣∣X=x
〉(X)
)
= law
(
x
)
, (1′)
law
(
f(measψ(X))
)
= law
(
measψ(f(X))
)
, (2′)
law
(
measUψ(X)
)
= law
(
measψ(U
∗XU)
)
, (3′)
where law denotes the probability law of the random variable in question,
so that in particular law(x) denotes the probability distribution degenerate
at the point x. An apparently weaker still set of assumptions would only
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restrict the mean values of the distributions in Assumptions 2 and 3:
E
(
f(measψ(X))
)
= E
(
measψ(f(X))
)
, (2′′)
E
(
measUψ(X)
)
= E
(
measψ(U
∗XU)
)
. (3′′)
As mentioned above, one can weaken the assumptions by restricting the
class of functions f or unitaries U for which the relevant equalities are
supposed to hold.
3. The first part of the proof
I return to a discussion of the assumptions after an outline of the proof of
my main result:
Pr
{
measψ(X) = x
}
=
∣
∣〈ψ
∣
∣X=x
〉∣∣2. (4)
I will make use of Assumptions 1–3 in their original form, postponing dis-
cussion of how one might reach the same conclusion from weaker versions of
the assumptions. In this section, following Deutsch, I only prove the result
in the special case (a)
∣∣ψ
〉
= 1√
2
( ∣∣X=x1
〉
+
∣∣X=x2
〉 )
, (5)
for which I am going to obtain the probabilities 1/2 for x = x1 and x = x2,
and zero for all other possibilities. After this, Deutsch attempts to general-
ize, first (b) to equal weight superpositions of a binary power of eigenstates
of X , next (c) to an arbitrary number, then (d) to dyadic rational superpo-
sitions, next (e) to arbitrary real superpositions, and finally (f) to arbitrary
superpositions. The proofs he gives of these steps are similarly incomplete.
I will complete the proof by an alternative and rather short route in the
next section, but return to Deutsch’s completion in the section after that.
Suppose u, a one-to-one correspondence on the eigenvalues of X , maps
x1 to x2 and vice-versa, and, after we have labelled the other eigenvales as
x′n, n ∈ Z, maps x
′
n to x
′
n+1. Let U denote the unitary which performs
the same permutation of the eigenvectors. Let u∗ denote the inverse of u.
Exploiting the relationship between u and U , and their relationship to X
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and ψ, as well as our other assumptions, we find,
Pr
{
measψ(X) = x1
}
= Pr
{
measUψ(X) = x1
}
= Pr
{
measψ(U
∗XU) = x1
}
= Pr
{
measψ(u(X)) = x1
}
= Pr
{
u(measψ(X)) = x1
}
= Pr
{
measψ(X) = u
∗(x1)
}
= Pr
{
measψ(X) = x2
}
. (6)
Replacing x1 by an eigenvalue x
′
n, i.e., any other than x1 or x2, and run-
ning through the same derivation, we see that all other eigenvalues have
equal probabilities. Since there are an infinite number of them, and since
according to our background assumption the outcome of measuring X lies
in its spectrum, we have obtained the required result: the probabilities of
x1 and x2 must both equal 1/2, all the other eigenvalues x
′
n must get zero
probability.
We used Assumptions 2 and 3 (functional and unitary invariance), not
Assumption 1 (degeneracy in an eigenstate). However, this assumption is
needed to deal with the case of . . . an eigenstate. The proof method allows
us to deal with an equal weight superposition of any positive finite number
of eigenstates of X . We only used functional invariance for one-to-one
functions.
Deutsch was only interested in mean values of the probability distribu-
tions of outcomes, since the fair value of the game: measure X on
∣
∣ψ
〉
and
receive the value of the outcome in euro’s (C== ), is precisely C== E
(
measψ(X)
)
.
(Here we are assuming that the utility of having some number of euro’s is
equal to that number. The reader may replace euro’s by dollars, camels, or
whatever else he or she prefers). In a moment I will also add a new game
to the discussion: measure X on
∣
∣ψ
〉
and receive C== 1 if the outcome x0 is
found. The value of this game should be C== |
〈
x0
∣
∣ψ
〉
|2.
Let us assume that the spectrum of X consists of all the integers (neg-
ative and non-negative). Then for given x1 and x2 there is an affine map
u(x) = ax + b = x1 + x2 − x which defines a unitary transformation U as
above. For these U , X and the same ψ as before we rewrite the argument
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before as
E
(
measψ(X)
)
= E
(
measUψ(X)
)
= E
(
measψ(U
∗XU)
)
= E
(
measψ(u(X))
)
= E
(
u(measψ(X))
)
= x1 + x2 − E
(
measψ(X)
)
(7)
yielding the required equality,
E
(
measψ(X)
)
= 1
2
(x1 + x2). (8)
Deutsch’s proof was a cryptic version of the argument I have just given,
except that he did not mention the unitary invariance assumption. He
writes v for value, instead of E. In my opinion, without the extra (unitary
invariance) assumption, his proof fails. The degeneracy Assumption 1 is not
used at this stage. However one may note that Assumption 1 (degeneracy)
implies that Assumption 3 (unitary invariance) holds when the state
∣∣ψ
〉
is
an eigenstate of the observableX . One could therefore consider Assumption
3 as a natural interpolation from Assumption 1. I return to this later.
As has been shown by de Finetti and by Savage, a rational decision
maker who must make choices when outcomes are ‘indeterminate’ (I must
avoid all terminology suggestive of probability theory, since the words ‘ran-
dom’, ‘probability’ and so on, are not allowed to be in our vocabulary)
behaves as if he (or she) has a prior probability distribution and indeed up-
dates it according to Bayes’ law when new information (outcomes) becomes
available. Thus it seems to me that whether one starts with utilities and
assumes rationality, or with probability and the frequency interpretation, is
very much a matter of taste. In my opinion the latter is closer to physical
experience and indeed we know that casinos and insurance companies make
good money from the frequency interpretation of chance.
I consider the many repetitions in the frequency interpretation to be
no more and no less than a thought experiment. When one claims that
the probability of some event is some number, one is asserting that the
situation in question is indistinguishable from a certain roulette game or
lottery. This allows me also to talk about probabilities of outcomes of
once-off experiments. For instance, a certain physical experiment might
have some chance of producing a black hole which would swallow the whole
universe. The probability that this would indeed happen, if the devilish
experiment were actually carried out, would be computed by doing real
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physics in which one would imaginarily set the chain of events into motion,
many many times, in which uncontrolled initial conditions would vary in
all kinds of ways from repetition to repetition. How they would vary, and
what possibilities could be considered equally likely, should be a matter
of scientific discussion. This may appear circular reasoning or an infinite
regress or just plain subjectivism, but this does not bother me: it works,
and it is not subjective, since we may rationally discuss the probability
modelling. When I use the mathematical model of probability, I am only
claiming an analogy with something familiar, like a casino, lottery, or coin
toss. I think that it is the same in the rest of physics, when we talk about
mass, electric charge, or magnetic field: we might think or we might hope
that we are talking about real things in the real world but we can only be
certain that we are talking about ingredients of mathematical models which
are anchored to the real world by analogies with familiar down to earth daily
experience. My frequentistic position is perhaps better labelled “Laplacian
counterfactual frequentism” and though one might collapse this label to
“subjectivism”, I believe it is as instrumentalistic or as operationalistic as
anything else in physics.
4. Completing the proof
More can be got out of the functional invariance assumption, by considering
other functions f , and most crucially, certain many-to-one functions. In my
opinion we must do this anyway, in order to complete the proof on the lines
indicated by Deutsch (see next section). It is an open question, whether
we can do without.
With the choice f = 1I{x}, and writing [X = x] for the projector onto
the eigenspace of X corresponding to eigenvalue x (and later also for the
eigenspace itself), since 1I{x}(X) = [X=x], we read off:
Pr
{
measψ(X) = x
}
= Pr
{
measψ([X=x]) = 1
}
. (9)
Indeed, if we only assume the mean value form of the functional invariance
assumption, we can read off the same conclusion, since the random variables
1I{x}(measψ(X)) and measψ([X=x]) are both zero-one valued.
Till this point we had dealt with nondegenerate observables and equal
weight superpositions of eigenstates. Now we can add to this, also degen-
erate observables (since these can always be written as functions of nonde-
generate observables). Moreover, even if we start with the assumptions in
their weaker mean value form, we can still obtain the stronger conclusion
about the whole probability law of the outcome.
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In fact, with brute force we arrive now very quickly at the most general
result (it remains, namely, to consider arbitrary states). From functional
invariance (whether in terms of probability laws or whether in terms of their
mean values) we have shown that a probability can be assigned to each
closed subspace of our Hilbert space, countably additive over orthogonal
subspaces, and equal to 1 on the whole space. Now we can invoke Gleason’s
theorem to conclude that the probability of any subspace is of the form
tr{ρA} for some density matrix ρ. It remains to show that ρ =
∣
∣ψ
〉〈
ψ
∣
∣
but this follows from our first axiom that measuring an observable on an
eigenstate yields with certainty the corresponding eigenvalue: consider the
observable X =
∣∣ψ
〉〈
ψ
∣∣ itself, and subspace A = [ψ] (the one-dimensional
subspace generated by
∣
∣ψ
〉
)!
Deutsch’s extension of his results to the most general case (see next sec-
tion) is very hard to follow. He repeatedly invokes substitutability, whereby
an outcome of one game may be replaced by a new game of the same value.
He does not say which substitutions are being made. However he is clearly
thinking of substitutions, leading to composite games with composite quan-
tum systems, product states, and observables on each subsystem. During
these constructions and substitutions, the observables being measured and
the states on which they are being measured, keep changing, while the
Spartan notation v(x) in which the symbol x refers to an observable, an
eigenvalue, and an eigenstate simultaneously, begs confusion. The mere
construction of product systems implies that more is being assumed above
the structure so far (so far we only spoke of observables and states on
one fixed quantum system). As I will indicate below, it appears that the
extra assumption of unitary invariance and the strengthened functional in-
variance assumption involving many-to-one functions as well as one-to-one
functions, together with a natural assumption about measuring separate
observables on a product system in a product state, enable one to fill the
gaps. If the repair job is not too difficult, one finishes with a relatively easy
proof of Gleason’s theorem, under the supplementary condition of unitary
invariance.
The construction of product systems will also help us extend results
from infinite-dimensional quantum systems to finite dimensional, including
2-dimensional—the case not covered by Gleason.
Functional invariance assumptions on product systems, or more gen-
erally, for compatible observables, play a key role in many foundational
discussions of quantum mechanics. Recall that observables X , Y commute
(or are compatible with one another) if and only if both are functions of a
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third Z; and the third can be chosen in such a way (with a minimal set of
eigenspaces) to make the mapping Z 7→ (X,Y ) a one-to-one correspondence
in the sense that we can writeX = f(Z), Y = g(Z), Z = h(X,Y ) where h is
the inverse of (f, g). In other words, two (or more) commuting observables
can be thought of as components of a vector-valued observable, or equiva-
lently as defining together one ‘ordinary’ observable. Whether one thinks
of them together as a vector or as a scalar observable is merely a question
of how the eigenspaces are labelled. One can define joint measurement of
compatible observables in several equivalent ways. Assuming Lu¨ders’ pro-
jection postulate for how a state changes on measurement, the sequential
measurements, in any order, of a collection of compatible observables, are
operationally indistinguishable from one another. One may therefore think
equally well of ‘one-shot’ measurement of Z, sequential measurement of X
then Y , and sequential measurement of Y then X .
This leads to a further extended functional invariance assumption:
law
(
f(measψ( ~X))
)
= law
(
measψ(f( ~X))
)
, (10)
where ~X = (X1, . . . , Xk) is a vector of mutually compatible observables
and f : Rk → Rm. Apparently weaker is the mean value form of this:
E
(
f(measψ( ~X))
)
= E
(
measψ(f( ~X))
)
; (11)
though as I showed above, by playing around with indicator functions, the
two are equivalent. We can recover from the assumption the fact that
the probability law of a measurement of X alone is the same as the first
marginal of the joint law of the two outcomes of a joint measurement of
commuting X , Y . As I have argued in Gill(1996a,b), these consequences of
the standard theory form a crucial though often only implicit ingredient in
many of the famous no-go arguments against hidden variables in the litera-
ture. Somewhat irreverently I have dubbed (11) ‘the law of the unconscious
quantum physicist’.
Deutsch’s approach is similar to that of some probabilists, in that he
would prefer to make Expectation central, and have Probability a conse-
quence (in fact, he would prefer to do without the word Probability alto-
gether). This is fine, and indeed many probabilists do take this approach
(Whittle in his textbook on Probability argues that one should do the same
for quantum probability, too). Now in our situation we want to start with
hypothesizing existence of mean values, and by making some structural as-
sumptions about them. From this we want to derive the form of the mean
values. As I have noted above, since 1I{x}(X) is a both an observable itself,
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and a function of the observable X , it would appear that fixing all mean
values of (outcomes of measurements of) all observables, fixes all proba-
bility laws of (outcomes of measurements of) all observables. The point I
want to make, is that this indeed works, provided we have the functional
invariance assumption (for mean values only, if you like, but we must have
if for a very large class of functions). Do we need to consider many-to-
one functions? If our assumptions are only about expectations, I think
we do need many-to-one functions. However, with modest distributional
input, one need further only consider one-to-one functions, as follows. Sup-
pose we know the mean value of measψ(exp(it arctanX)), and suppose we
assume functional invariance, in law, for all one-to-one functions; in partic-
ular, the functions f(x) = exp(it arctanx), for each real t. Then we know
law(measψX). It is possible to avoid complex-valued functions, try for in-
stance f(x) = s cos(1
2
(arctanx+π/2))+ t sin(1
2
(arctanx+π/2)) for all real
s and t.
Let me return to the contrast between Deutsch’s and Gleason’s argu-
ment. Deutsch’s proof, on completion, seems a little simpler and more
direct. His assumptions are much stronger: he needs unitary invariance.
His assumptions are more representative of classical quantum mechanics—
unitary evolution has to be considered an essential part of this. In the
first stages of his argument, deriving mean values for some rather special
observables and rather special states, he moreover only needed to consider
functional invariance under one-to-one transformations. This assumption
is close to tautological (the apparatus for measuring a + bX is not going
to be essentially different from that for measuring X). However, even from
the point of view of deriving fair values of games, probability laws as well
as mean values are equally relevant. For instance, what is the fair value of
the game: measure X and receive C== 1 if the outcome x0 is obtained? The
easiest way to deal with this game too, is to include functional invariance
for the indicator functions too, and then one need not work any more but
simply appeal to Gleason’s theorem.
5. Discussion
Later in this section I will run through Deutsch’s steps to complete his
proof. The aim will be to see whether, with weaker versions of our main
assumptions, not strong enough to give us Gleason’s assumptions so eas-
ily, we could also arrive at the desired conclusion. (The answer is that at
present, I do not know). But first I would like to discuss what grounds one
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could have for the functional and unitary invariance assumptions, against
the background assumptions that measuring an observable yields an eigen-
value, and that in an eigenstate, the outcome is certain.
Functional invariance for one-to-one functions seems to me more or less
definitional. For many-to-one it is much less definitional, also less empirical,
since there will vary rarely truely exist essentially different measurement
apparatuses for ‘doing’ X and doing f(X). Just occasionally there will
be empirical evidence supporting functional invariance: for instance, when
X and Y do not commute, but for some many-to-one functions, one has
f(X) = g(Y ), there might be empirical (statistical) data supporting it,
based on the quite different experiments for measuring X and for mea-
suring Y , and finding the same statistics (or mean values) for f of the
outcomes of the first experiment, g of the outcomes of the second. There
is one very strong empirical fact supporting the assumption (in its form
for vector observables): when we simultaneously measure observables on
separate components of a product system (even if in an entangled state)
we have the same marginal statistics, as if only one component was being
measured. Altogether, the nature of this assumption would seem to me
to be: we extend a definitional assumption concerning a smaller class of
functions f—the affine functions—to a much larger class, by mathematical
analogy, trusting that the world is so elegantly and mathematically put
together, that the ‘obvious’ sweeping mathematical generalization of an in-
dubitable fact is usually correct; we are supported in this by some empirical
(statistical) evidence for some special cases.
Similarly the assumption of unitary invariance seems to be largely a leap
of faith, since there will be little empirical (statistical) evidence to support
it. But again, one might prefer to think of the leap of faith as a natu-
ral mathematical generalization. Our first assumption—that measuring an
observable on an eigenstate produces the eigenvalue—tells us
law
(
measUψ(X)
)
= law
(
measψ(U
∗XU)
)
, (12)
whenever U permutes eigenspaces and ψ is an eigenvector! Extending this
to arbitrary states can be thought of as an interpolation, in harmony with
ideas of wave-particle duality. It seems to me that wave-particle duality—
the very heart of quantum physics—essentially forces probability on us,
since it is the only way to get a smooth interpolation between the distinct
discrete behaviours at different eigenstates of an observable. We just have
to live with smoothness at the statistical level, instead of at the (counter-
factual) level of individual outcomes.
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I would now like to discuss the remaining steps of Deutsch’s proof. As
we saw, functional invariance in its strongest form implies the conditions
of Gleason’s theorem, which makes all further conditions and further work
superfluous. Now the reason functional invariance is so powerful, is that we
assumed it to hold for all functions f , in particular, many-to-one functions.
In the spirit of the first part of Deutsch’s proof it would make sense to
demand it only for one-to-one functions. It seems to me a reasonable
conjecture that Deutsch’s theorem is true under the three assumptions:
functional invariance for one-to-one functions, unitary invariance, and the
degeneracy assumption.
As was stated earlier, after (a) the two-eigenstate equal weight super-
position, Deutsch extends this (b) to binary powers, (c) to arbitrary whole
numbers of equal weight superpositions, (d) to rational superpositions, (e)
to real and finally (f) to arbitrary. As we saw, steps (b) and (c) can also
be dealt with by his own method for the two-eigenstate case. Deutsch’s
argument for (d) involves completely new ingredients and assumptions. He
supposes that an auxiliary quantum system can be brought into interac-
tion with the system under study, thus yielding a product space and a
product state. The observable of interest X is identified with X ⊗ 1, and
this is considered as one of a pair (X ⊗ 1,1⊗ Y ) where the observable Y
is cleverly chosen, so that in the product system, and with this product
observable, we are back in an equal weight superposition of eigenstates. He
then makes the assumption: measuringX on the original system is the same
as measuring (X,Y ) on the product sytem and discarding the outcome of
Y . Uncontroversial though this may be, we are greatly expanding on the
background assumptions. Moreover we are actually assuming functional
invariance for a many-to-one function: namely, the function which delivers
the x-component of a pair (x, y). By the way, Deutsch’s proofs of steps (b)
and (c) similarly involve such constructions. Step (e) is an approximation
argument which can presumably be made rigorous, though perhaps differ-
ently to how Deutsch does it. Step (f) as presented by Deutsch involves yet
another new assumption: measuring an observable can be represented as a
unitary transformation on a suitable product system, so that after a new
unitary transformation mapping
∣
∣x
〉
to e−iφ
∣
∣x
〉
one can remove complex
phases from a superposition of eigenstates. This argument seems to be un-
necessarily complicated. Our unitary invariance assumption together with
the unitary transformation just described, takes care of extending results
from real to complex superpositions.
The work of Deutsch has been strongly criticised by Finkelstein (1999)
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and by Barnum et al (1999). They also point out that the first step of
Deutsch’s proof is incorrect, however, do not recognise that it can be re-
paired by a supplementary, natural, condition. They also point out that
Gleason’s theorem does the same job as Deutsch purports to do, but do
not see the very close connection between Gleason’s and Deutsch’s assump-
tions. They point out also that the later steps of Deutsch’s proof depend
on various appeals to the substitutability principle, without stating which
games were to be substituted for which. I must admit that it took me a
long email correspondence with David Deutsch, before I was able for my-
self to fill in all the gaps. Finally they also point out that the work of de
Finetti and Savage implies that rational behaviour under uncertainty im-
plies behaviour as if probability is there. It is therefore just a question of
taste whether or not one adds a probability interpretation to the ‘values of
games’ derived by Deutsch.
My conclusion is that Deutsch’s proof as it stands is valid, though the
author is implicitly using unitary as well as functional invariance. All his
assumptions together imply the assumptions of Gleason’s theorem, and
much more. Consequently the proof as given does not have a great deal
of mathematical interest. However the fact that distributional conclusions
could already be drawn for some states and some observables, at a point
at which only functional invariance for one-to-one functions had been used,
and in my opinion, with a most elegant argument, justifies the conjecture
I have already mentioned:
Conjecture 1 Deutsch’s theorem is true under the three assumptions:
functional invariance for one-to-one functions, unitary invariance, and the
degeneracy assumption.
Unitary invariance alone tells us that the law of the outcome of a mea-
surement of X only depends on the absolute innerproducts |
〈
x
∣
∣ψ
〉
|. So the
task is to determine the form of the dependence.
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